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PREFACE 
This is one of a set of three working papers concerned with 
the System and Decision Sciences task on Institutional Aspects 
of Risk Management. 
Even a cursory comparison of the way the same technological 
risks are handled reveals that things get done differently in 
different countries. And, within any one country, the debate 
about how to improve the handling of those risks is often a 
debate between the advocates of several of these different 
ways of doing things. 
To understand these differences we need to develop a 
cultural theory about the appropriateness and the credibility 
of risk-handling institutions. Since to invoke gross differences 
between national cultures would be to ignore the polarized 
debates within each nation, we need rather the idea of cultural 
bias - the contradictory predilectionsr ideas of nature, and 
personal strategies to which different individuals in the same 
society can adhere. In this way the cultural approach goes 
beyond the comparative study of institutions to investigate 
the social processes responsible for the ebb and flow of support 
between alternative institutional frameworks. 
The first paper - Political Culture: an Introduction - 
provides some of the intuitive background for this approach. 
The second paper - An Outline of the Cultural Theory of Risk - 
gives a more formal treatment of this cultural theory as it 
emerges in the particular context with which we are concerned: 
risk. The third paper - Beyond Self-Interest: A Cultural 
Analysis of a Risk Debate - is an attempt to apply this theory 
to one of the case studies currently being assembled by the 
Management and Technology group that is investigating the ways 
in which the risks inherent in Liquid Energy Gases are handled 
in the process of terminal siting. 
AN OUTLINE OF THE CULTURAL THEORY OF RISK 
Michael Thompson 
INTRODUCTION 
The Working Paper P o l i t i c a l  C u l t u r e :  An I n t r o d u c t i o n  has 
provided something of the intuitive background to this cultural 
approach and we can now move on to a more formal treatment of 
the theory on which it is based. 
Social Context 
In the social sciences, psychologists have traditionally 
focused on the i n d i v i d u a l  while sociologists and anthropologists 
have concentrated on the larger scale arrangements that result 
from the social relationships be tween  individuals - clans, 
classes, lineages, hierarchies, age-grades ... corporations. Both 
these - the individual and the various relationships that make 
him into a member of society - can be handled by the concept 
of social context. It is a concept that, crossing these custom- 
ary disciplinary boundaries, allows us to move smoothly back and 
forth between the micro concerns of the psychologist and the 
macro concerns of the sociologist and anthropologist. The totality 
is described in terms of each of its constituent elements 
(individuals) and their various social contexts (their myriad 
relationships with other individuals). 1 
But the usefulness of this social context concept will 
depend on the extent to which it can make some generalisations 
about the differences between individuals. If at the end of our 
scrutiny each individual emerges with a unique social context 
that distinguishes and sets him apart from every other individual, 
then little theoretical or practical progress wiLl have been nade. 
The same is true for those other extremes of outcome: that in 
which every individual (being related to every other individual) 
emerges with an identical social context, and that in which we 
cannot distinguish any criteria for deciding whether one 
individual's social context is the same as or different from 
that of some other individual. On the positive side, if these 
obstacles can be avoided then social context will provide us with 
a concept applicable to any human being, anywhere ... anytime - 
it is not subject to cultural2, historical, technological, 
ecological or social qualifications. Whether it is of any use 
or not will depend entirely on whether it can avoid being so 
particularistic that every individual has to be seen as a 
special case without, at the same time, being so universalistic 
that everyone ends up the same. 
The schematic representation (Figure 1. Political Culture: 
An Introduction) in which the two dimensions of social context 
permit us to distinguish five distinct categories into which 
individuals must fall, each distinct conjunction of individual 
and social context being stabilized by a distinctive cultural 
bias (or cosmology), most certainly avoids these twin pitfalls: 
particularism and universalism. Five not only lies somewhere 
between one and infinity, it is an eminently handleable number 
as well. If we only need take five biases - five kinds of social 
individual, five cosmologies, five kinds of perceptions of risk. .. 
five risk-handling strategies - into account then an anthropological 
theory of risk is not just possible, it is immediately useable 
as well. 
I should perhaps stress here that the commitment is not to 
the number five but to Intermediate Sociology3 - to the existence 
of some handleable and cross-culturally valid basis for the 
disaggregation of individuals into a number of categories, that 
number lying somewhere between one (universalism) and infinity 
(particularism). I would, for reasons of practicality and 
application, prefer the number to be small rather than large andam 
therefore pleased that a fivefold arrangement is both predicted 
on theoretical grounds (given certain specified assumptions) and 
appears to work quite well in practice. But I would have no 
objections to this intermediate number being, say, three or six 
or eight if such a categorisation gave better results in practice 
and could be predicted theoretically by making certain specified 
changes in the initial assumptions (and provided those changes 
were more realistic than those used to generate the fivefold 
categorisation). 
The TwoDimensionsof Social Context 
In sketching out the intuitive background I spoke of the two 
social context dimensions as running from 'individualised' to 
'collectivised' and from 'egalitarian' to 'hierarchical' but, 
in this more formal account I need to speak of group (the extent 
to which an individual is involved in, or free from, bounded 
social groups) and grid (the extent to which he is subject to 
socially-imposed prescriptions). For example, the member of a 
high caste is clearly a member of a bounded social group, but the 
dietary and pollution-avoiding prescriptions that he has to 
observe are not the consequence of his membership of the group 
itself but of that group's relationshipswith other groups - of 
its rigorously defined and energetically maintained position 
within a heirarchical arrangement of groups. By contrast, a 
member of an egalitarian group - one with no internal 
differentiation and with no defined relationships with other 
groups - would score high on the group dimension but low on the 
grid dimension. 
But this idea of high and low scores on the two dimensions 
is still not enough to capture the full complexity of what is 
going on. The social context of an individual who is not a member 
of any groups, because there are no groups around for him to be 
a member of, is very different from that of the individual who 
finds himself expelled from the group to which he looks in vain 
for his support. The first has zero group; the second, negative 
group. The same sort of thing applies to the grid limension. 
The prescriptions that this dimension reflects are iaposed by 
hierarchy - either the hierarchies that result from competitive 
personal network-building or the hierarchical arrangements, not 
of individuals, but of groupings of individuals. Again, the 
context of the individual who, withdrawing into autonomy, is 
able to avoid any coercive involvement in personal networks and 
that of the individual who, try as he may, can neither withdraw 
from such involvement nor fight his way into any central positions 
within the networks that he is involved with are not at all +he 
same. The first has zero grid; the second, positive grid. So 
it is not simply a matter of high and low scores; each dimension 
has a zero point from which scores may be high or low in two 
directions: positive and negative. Since it turns out that 
it is only possible to measure social context on ordinal scales, 
the maximum number of categories that we can distinguish with 
two dimensions is five (and, if the scales did not have zero 
points, we would only be able to distinguish four and we would 
be unable to recognise the distinctiveness of those hermit-like 
individuals who score low, or zero, on both dimensions).4 (Fig. 1) 
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Figure 1. Social context and cultural categories 
Of course, at this stage, I am not justified in assuming 
that these five categories are fully separate in the way I have 
depicted them here. They might all overlap with one another to 
such an extent that any disaggregation based on them would be 
very messy indeed. The argument for them being clearly separate, 
and for them providing a basis for non-messy disaggregation, 
only emerges when we go on to consider a third dimension that, 
while it is not a dimension of social context, is controlled by 
it. (It is, in fact, a one dimensional behavior space with social 
context acting as its two dimensional control space). 
Power and Control 
I have argued that each conjunction of social context and 
cosmology will generate its own distinctive strategy and that 
this strategy will result either in the individual manipulating 
others or being himself manipulated. The members of a sect end 
up manipulated (collectively); the members of a caste (collectively) 
manipulate. Entrepreneurs clearly are (individualistic) 
manipulators while those whose lives are 'like a lottery' are 
equally clearly being manipulated (individually). Only those 
individuals who operate the autonomous strategy appropriate to 
the hermit, and who successfully avoid all coercive involvement 
with their fellow men, will end up neither manipulating nor 
manipulated. 5 
If we add this third dimension, manipulation, to the two 
social context dimensions and join these five equilibrium statcs 
together in the simplest possible way we obtain a graph something 
like this: (Figure 2 )  
Figure 2. Relationship between social context and manipulation. 
Topologically, if you have two basins and two hilltops arranged 
in this way then the landscape must contain a fifth equilibrium 
state - a saddle point. It may, of course, contain other equi- 
librium points as well but this is its simplest possible con- 
figuration. The five equilibrium states (the five 'flat bits') 
are now clearly separated from one another by means of dis- 
equilibrium states (the intervening slopes). This diagram (or 
simple variations of it) is my hypothesis.6 
The Five Strategies 
With each social context there goes a distinct rationality - 
a world view, a cosmology, a cultural bias... a particular way 
of seeing the world and man's place within it - that provides a 
moral justification for certain kinds of actions and a basis for 
moral disapprobation of other kinds of actions. The idea is 
that social context and world view will tend to stabilize one 
another and that, as people in a shared context come to share a 
particular world view, so they acquire and sustain a particular 
morality that enables them continually to make judgements on 
human actions: rewarding some and punishing others. The hypoth- 
esis states that such shareability - such stabilization of moral 
community - can only occur at or near these five equilibrium 
states and that each requires a distinct personal strategy to 
maintain its stability. 
The result of all this is that individuals in different 
social contexts will tend to home in onto distinctive strategies 
that will enable them to act so as to steer some optimal personal 
course through all these socially-imposed rewards and penalties. 
And, if you observe an individual as he follows one of these 
strategies, you will discover whether he ends up manipulating 
others or being himself manipulated. It is these disjunctions 
of manipulation - sometimes positive, sometimes negative ... 
sometimes zero - that are responsible for the clear separation 
of the cosmologies and their associated strategies. 
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Figure 3. Thumbnail Sketch of the Strategies, the Cosmologies 
and the Justifications. 
The Social 3ases of Perception 
The unique7combination of world view and strategy that is 
appropriate to each social context results in an individual in 
that context perceiving his external world in a distinctive way. 
So this hypothesis forms the basis for an anthropological theory 
of perception* - not of how we perceive (physiology) nor of what 
we all perceive (psychology) but of the patternings that, when 
more than one perception is possible, are socially imposed in 
order that certain ixoral commitments may be rendered self-evident. 
.Since risk is very much a moral question (and never more so 
than when it is being asserted that it isnot) and since, as the 
history of risk assessment clearly demonstrates, widely divergent 
convictions as to what the risks 'out there' are can often coexist 
within the same society, this hypothesis should also provide us 
with a theory capable of handling these cultural bicises both as 
to how risks are perceived and as to how they are evaluated. 
RISK PERCEPTION AND RISK EVALUATION 
I have already, in the intuitive background (Working Paper: 
Political culture: A n  Introduction), touched on how the perception 
of different kinds of risks varies with social context and how the 
evaluations that different people place on risks vary according 
to where those risks are situated in time and according to the 
degree of control an individual feels he has over events in time. 
I would not claim, at present, to have a fully-developed cultural 
theory of risk - the full development of such a theory is one of 
my objectives - but I do already have sufficient insighc into the 
subject to be able to set out the broad framework of such a 
theory. A convenient way of doing this is to reorganise and 
summarise the argument so far in terms of the now more formally 
presented hypothesis. 
First of all, which risks are perceived? Making just the 
simple division of time into the short term and the long term is 
sufficient to separate three contexts - those in which we will 
find experts - from the other two - those in which experts are 
absent. Expertise and perception of the long term go hand-in- 
hand; so, if you only perceive the short term, there is no 
chance of you becoming an expert. But your inability to per- 
ceive the long term may be by choice or it may be by compulsion 
and this distinction provides a second criterion which enables 
us to separate these two expert-less contexts - that of the 
hermit (by choice) and that of the lifeis-like-a-lottery man 
(by compulsion). Turning to the three categories in which the 
long term is perceived, we meet three different kinds of expert9 
and the problem is to explain why each kind of expert is 
appropriate to his particular category. 
Both the entrepreneur and the sect member are able to 
perceive both the short and the long terms but they evaluate 
them very differently. For the entrepreneur, the short term 
dominates the long term; he is in the business of manipulation 
but he is realistic enough to know that his manipulation,being the 
product of his own energy (rather than of the authority of an 
institutionalised office that he, for a time, fills), does not 
extend too far into the future. Being an expansive optimist, 
he allays his fears that his short term successes may not continue 
indefinitely by insisting that the long term will turn out to be 
a prolongation of the short term. He is predisposed to give 
credence to the 'business as usual' scenario. 
The sect member's evaluations of the short and long terms 
are the reverse of the entrepreneur's. Collectivised within his 
wall of virtue, and with little control over the short term, his 
main concern is just to survive; he sees himself as one of the 
meek who, in the long term, will inherit the earth.lO In this 
way, the optimistically perceived long term comes to dominate 
the gloomy short term. If there is to be a long term at all, 
then the short term will have to be radically changed now. He 
is, in consequence, predisposed to grant credence to the 'no 
growth' (the 'radical change now') scenario. 
Where both the entrepreneur's and the sect member's 
evaluations of the long and short terms are unbalanced (with 
the short term dominant for the entrepreneur and the long term 
dominant for the sect member) theevaluations of the caste 
member are quite nicely balanced. This is the context occupied 
by the planner and the bureaucrat. Insulated from the pressing 
daily concerns of the entrepreneur by the institutionalised 
framework that guarantees the continued existence of the office 
that he fills, he is able to give adequate attention to the long 
term. What is more, he sees events in that long term as being 
controllable, not by him personally, but by the complex collec- 
tivity of which he is a self-effacing part. Being part of an 
elaborate hierarchy he is predisposed to be sensitive to fine 
distinctions and, in consequence, is unlikely to see the long 
term as a mere extension of the short term or v i c e  v e r s a  (and, of 
course, he would be out of a job if he conceded that there was 
no such distinction). Each is seen in a balanced and discrimi- 
nating way and, since collective control over events is seen as 
extending far beyond the short term, the long term is viewed with 
cautious optimism. The result is a willingness to grant credence 
to the so-called 'middle of the road' scenario. (I use 'so-called' 
not because I wish to denigrate it in relation to the other two 
expert scenarios, but in order to stress that it derives from 
a distinct and separate evaluation of the long and short terms 
and is not simply some compromise between the 'business as usual' 
and the 'no growth' scenarios. l l Nor do I make any value 
distincticns between 'balanced' and 'unbalanced'). 
I can summarise these criteria - long versus short 
sightedness, choice versus compulsion, short term dominance 
versus l o ~ g  term dominance, and balanced versus unbalanced 
evaluaticn - for separating the five categories with the help 
of the basic diagram (Figure 4): 
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Figure 4. Criteria for separating the five categories 
Next, I should ask how the acceptability of risks varies 
with social context. There are some philosophical problems 
here because, as I have just argued, the perception of risks 
also varies witk social context. Just because an individual 
cannot see a risk it does not follow that he is not exposed to 
it (and an individual in a different social context may well be 
able to see that he is exposed to it). But, if he does not 
even know that the risk that he is exposed to is there, is it 
valid to speak of him ' accepting' that risk? On top of this 
there are the risks that, though they are not actually there, 
are believed to be there (and an individual in another social 
context may well be able to see that they are not there). Such 
non-existent risks may, in some contexts, constitute a major 
proportion of the risks that are perceived in those contexts 
and they may be managed by all sorts of socially-imposed rewards 
and penalities which, in turn, provide the incentives for their 
acceptance or avoidance. 
The hypothesis is designed to cope with these sorts of 
problems but, before we talk about 'the acceptability of risk', 
we should bear in mind the fact that the pool of risks to which 
our acceptance/avoidance criteria will be applied is itself 
highly fluid. It may fill up or empty according to whether our 
perception extends tothelong term or is restricted to the short 
term, and it may fill up with all sorts of risks tLat aren't 
there but are believed to be there. 
It is unlikely that we will find many of these non-existent 
risks in the two myopic contexts, nor in the context of the 
entrepreneur, because such risks are usually concerned with 
concepts of pollution and defilement - of purity and danger1* - 
and such concepts are little, if at al1,developed in the cos- 
mologies appropriate to thesecontexts. Concepts of pollution arise 
where there are boundaries and distinctions to be maintained - 
in those contexts which score strongly positive on the group 
dimension. For instance, it is probably safe to say that there 
is no real physical risk involved in eating cooked rice on which 
the shadow of an untouchable has fallen (or, at least, no more 
risk than if the shadow has not fallen on it) yet such a risk 
is believed to be there, and a great deal of trouble is taken to 
avoid it, in the strongly positive group and strongly positive 
grid context of the high caste Hindu. The risk, of course, is 
to the intricate and highly discriminated social fabric but it 
is externalised and given expression in terms of the physical 
world of lightamd shadow, nutrition and bodily processes. 
Poll-ution concepts develop rather differently in the social 
context of the sect member because his group is internally 
undifferentiated and rejects, rather than negotiates relationships 
with, the rest of society. Here there is only one crucial 
boundary to be defended - that which separates and protects the 
good vulnerable 'us' on the inside from the nasty predatory 
'them' on the outside. Only by ceaselessly patrolling and 
maintaining this boundary canthe sect retain its cohesion and 
survive through time. So the risks are real enough and the 
institutionalised steps that are taken to minimise them - the 
witchcraft accusations, the denunciations, the confessions and 
the expulsions - do serve a vital purpose but, though they are 
expressed as such, they are not risks inherent in the physical 
world.13 And, even when the risk is there in the physical world, 
the concern that surrounds it may well derive from some physically 
nonexistent s o c i a l  risk that overlays it. Let there be no doubt 
that many of the most feared risks in technologies such as nuclear 
power are of this social kind. The anthropological approach 
provides us with a means of identifying them and of taking them 
seriously. 
The way in which all these factors - (1) the perception of 
risks, (2) their acceptability, (3) the overlaying of social 
(physically non-existent) risks, and (4) the rewards and penalties 
for different kinds of risks - vary with social context can be 
summarised like this. (Figure 5) 
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Figure 5. Risk and social context. 
Next, and this at present is the least developed and most 
speculative part of the theory, I should try to make some 
predictions about the sorts of social and cultural institutions - 
about the different styles of risk management - that are likely 
to emerge within each context. 
In the life-is-like-a-lottery context, individuals are 
very alone and very powerless to influence events. Such insti- 
tutions as are able to emerge here furnish the occupants, not 
with a style for managing risk, but rather for just coping with 
it. They make something of a virtue out of necessity. Since the 
occupants have ignorance imposed upon them, they might as well 
see it as blissful and, since they have no way of mitigating what- 
ever the risks out there are, they night as well comfort themselves 
by the tough-minded and slightly braggardly assertion that what 
you don't know can't harm you. To have to search for and identify 
the cause of every harm that befell the members of this context 
would divert their meagre resources away from their number one 
concern: survival. 
Yet this seeking of an explanation for every ill is precisely 
what those in the other survival context - that of the sect 
member - insist on. In this context a person dies, not because 
his number is up, but because someone somewhere has caused him 
to die. It may be his own transgression or it may be the work 
of some other agent and the whole institutionalised framework of 
social risks and their causality is invoked in order to find the 
culprit and to exact the appropriate penalty. The easy give- 
and-take that concepts of chance and probability bring to the 
interplay between harm and its causation is not to be found here. 
No 'background' risk is acceptable, all harm has to be accounted 
for... partial models full of slippage, tolerance and expediency 
and incorporating the idea that some risk is inevitable, and 
that particular deaths are its statistically inevitable outcome, 
are rejected. Instead, we have a holistic style of risk manage- 
ment - a total system model in which causal links can be (and are) 
traced until the blame for every particular misfortune can be 
laid at some particular door. The anthropological literature 
on witchcraft accusations14 clearly reveals that these linkages 
are always traced in such a way as to minimise, not the physical 
risks, but the social risks. 
Why should these 'home-made' theories of causation and 
blame be so very different between these two survival contexts? 
The answer is that elaborate theories of causation and blame can 
only be constructed within a scaffolding of social risks and social 
risks can only exist if there is some social structure there for 
them to threaten. For the sect, its wall of virtue is its 
r a i s o n  d ' e t r e ;  in the anomic setting of individualist survival 
there i s  no social structure. 
The styles of risk management that emerge in the contexts 
of the hermit and the entrepreneur have a number of features in 
common. Since both contexts are individualised,and since both 
focus optimistically on the short term, there is a tendency to 
regard risk management as a personal business and to emphasise 
the importance of individual skill and judgement. Where there 
exists a choice between handling risks individualistically (by 
the market, for instance) and handling them collectively (by 
regulation, for instance) both hermit and entrepreneur wiil 
favor che former. Both will be biased against institutions that 
collectivise risks, or convert voluntary into involuntary ones. 
They will instead tend to give their support to those more diffuse 
institutions that, directly or indirectly (but more likely in- 
directly) increase the areas of risk that are left to individual 
values and decrease the areas that are handled by social choice.15 
However, despite these similarities, there is some divergence 
in risk-handling style which derives from the different levels of 
manipulation that go with these two contexts. The hermit neither 
coerces others nor is himself coerced and this means that, when 
he supports institutions that individualise risks, those risks 
remain closely attached to the individual who chooses to take them. 
But, when the entrepreneur supports similar institutions, his risks 
are, to some extent, exported. tothose individuals who he is 
successfully manipulating. This is undoubtedly a very effective, 
if inequitable, way to manage risk and much of our present worries 
about risk are attributable to the fact that many ricks that used 
to be exported in this way are now bearing down upon individuals 
in other, less impotent, contexts. As has often been pointed 
out, the difference between the risks involved in coal-mining and 
in nuclear power is that in the former they kill only coalziliners 
vhile in the latter they may kill you and me as well. 
In the two contexts with strongly positive group there will 
be a bias toward institutions that take risk-handling away from 
the individual and give it to the whole, or to some agency 
charged withtheresponsibility for handling it on behalf of ttz 
whole. The internally undifferentiated (and therefore egalitarian) 
sect will favor holistic risk management; the internally 
differentiated (and therefore hierarchical) caste will favor 
management by specialised and professionally-staffed agencies. 
Such hierarchical systems are based on many fine yet clearly 
defined distinctions and they build up into complex social 
structures that are all too easily threatened. This means that 
social risks - anything that threatens to diminish the clarity 
of these distinctions - are particularly to be feared, and the 
result is that risks come to be handled not holistically but in 
a compartmentalised way. It is this chopping up of risks (and 
everything else) in order to minimise the social risks that 
justifies the cruel definition of bureaucracies as systems in- 
capable of learning from their mistakes. Yet their record for 
handling social risks, albeit of their own making, is vastly 
superior to that of the sects. Sects are always falling apart 
but bureaucracies seem to know intuitively how to ensure their 
own existence - they do it so instinctively that they scarcely 
make any mistakes to learn from. Nor, when it comes to the real 
physical risks, is any purpose served by urging bureaucracies 
to abandon their chopped-up models in favor of holistic ones - it 
is not in their nature to do this. What is possible is to re- 
organise some of the dividing lines, even making some new ones 
where appropriate, so that as the social risks are managed the 
physical ones get looked after as well. And, of course, it is 
always possible (it has just been done for energy in the United 
States) to create a new high status agency specially charged 
with the task of cutting through theboundariescreated by other 
lower status agencies within the framework. 
It is significant that the study of risk (which has largely 
been developed in and for this sort of context) has itself been 
compartmentalised. Risk assessment has been restricted to the 
real (physical world) risks while social scientists have been 
careful to restrict themselves to the social (the physically non- 
existent) risks. Both are reluctant to step outside their spheres 
of competence and put the two kinds of risk together. 
THE EFFICACY OF THE FIVE STYLES 
I am now face to face with a question that I can do little 
more than pose. Having tentatively described these different 
styles of risk management, how effective are they? 
A first temptation might be to assume that, since the whole 
bebate is conducted in the idiom of real physical risks, those I 
styles that concern themselves only with those risk:- will be 
more effective than those that concern themselves with risks that 1 
are, in fact, non-existent physically. But who is to say which 
are the more potentially damaging: the physical risks 'out theret 
or the real physical consequences of the collapse of a large part 
of our social order and its stabilizing institutions? Rather 
than rush to such hasty and simple-minded evaluations of these 
different styles of risk management, we should concede that in 
social systems where such threatenable social structures exict 
(and that includes a22 advanced industrialised nations) social 
risks are among the most serious of the risks that have, somehow 
or other, to be managed. It is no good crying that physical 
scientists cannot be expected to give their attention to social 
risks, nor can the social scientists justify their remaining 
inside their disciplinary stockade. Experts may divide the 
world up into areas of expertise, responsibility may be chopped 
up between government departments, and select committees may be 
limited by their terms of reference but the fact remains that the 
risks we face and the risks we have to manage are not neatly com- 
partmentalised- like it or not, they spill across from technology 
to technology16 and from the physical world into the social world. 
In adopting a style of risk management based on the assess- 
ment of the external ,real physical world) risks, we come more and 
more to resemble the members of W.H. Auden's expedition: 
... sound on Expectation 
Had there been situations to be in; 
Unluckily they were their situation: 
(from 'The Quest') 
How can we modify our risk management so that it becomes responsive 
both to the external and the internal risks? 
A first step is the recognition that both kinds of risk 
are there, and the second step is the development of some sort of 
theory that casts its net wide enough to catch them both. This is 
what the cultural approach is aimed at. It generates sets of 
hypothesesthat predict how and when such risks will be present 
and which allow us to recognise them for what they are. From 
the debate we can disentangle the external and the internal 
risks - the physical and the social - and we can take each kind 
seriously. When we recognise that we have caught a social - a 
physically non-existent - risk in our methodological net, we do 
not say 'Oh, it's just a social risk' and throw it back into the 
ocean. We recognise that it is a risk - a particular kind of risk - 
and we can refer it to our conceptual scheme to obtain some 
estimation of how serious a risk it is and of how it might best 
be handled. 
In considering the efficacy of the different styles of risk 
management it is not a matter of deciding which is the bestandwhich 
is the worst. It depends on the risk it is being asked to 
handle. Nor should we assume that the risk-handling that goes 
on in the myopic contexts is invariably inferior to that of the 
contexts that extend perception to the long term. Individuals 
stabilised around the zero group and zero grid context and 
practising the autonomous strategy tend to be organised into very 
small economic units17 and it seems likely that the zbsence of 
economies of scale is a necessary condition for the stability 
ofthis equilibrium. The combination of the small scale of their 
economic operations and the lack of pressure on individuals to 
maximise their control over resources has the effect of 
minimising long term risks and, in consequence, a style of risk 
management based on the principle 'sufficient unto the day is 
the evil thereof', far from being recklessly improvident 
(criminally negligent, even) assures a rapid and highly resilirnt 
response to the unexpected. 
The same, to some extent, holds for the entrepreneur's style 
of risk management. Like the autonomous individual, he too 
devotes most of his attention to the short term and reassures 
himself that, thanks to the similarly near-focused efforts of 
his fellc:ws, the hidden hand can be relied upon to maximise 
wealth and minimise risk in the longer tern. But, of course, his 
economic activities are not always small in scale and he is 
often anxious to maximise his control over resources. l 8  Though 
the autonomous individual is not consciously a conservationist 
(such 'conscious conservationists' are found in the two strongly 
positive group contexts) he usually, thanks to his minimal yet 
resilient and responsive style of risk management, ends up 
conserving his environment. The same is not always true of the 
entrepreneur; much depends on the scale of his operation. 
It is interesting to note that Small is Beautiful, not in the 
social context where this principle is most strongly espoused 
(that of the sect member) but in the very different and strongly 
individualised contexts of the hermit and the entrepreneur.19 
There are two blots on the entrepreneur's risk managing 
copybook - the despoiling of the long term that may occur as a 
result of the scale of his activities, and the exportation of 
risk that can go on under the banners of market forces and 
individual freedom. Regulation - the caste member's preferred 
style of risk management - is, at present, a very blunt weapon 
which does not discriminate at all well between the negative and 
the positive contributions of the entrepreneur. Much regulation 
is counterproductive; the problem is to know which. This cultural 
approach may help us to do this. If it can help us pinpoint 
just when the entrepreneur is threatening the long term, then 
regulation can be slimmed down until it is targetted on these 
danger areas. At the same time, regulation could be made much 
more effective in its role as a system of export control designed 
to mitigate the excesses that are at present visited upon those 
(the survival individualists) least equipped to bear them. 
And what of the survival collectivists - the sect members? 
If all their rhetoric about the horrendous risks that everywhere 
threaten the extinction of the human race is really aimed at 
averting the social risks that threaten not the whole of society 
but just their own cohesion and identity, should we pay any 
attention to them? A first response is that, equipped with this 
cultural understanding of what is involved in their style of 
risk management, we should not be too eager to believe that 
the external risks really are what they say they are. We can, 
with these anthropological insights, obtain some estimate of the 
extent to which these risks are indeed there in the external 
world and the extent to which they constitute an ove;.lay of social 
risks that threaten, not the institutions of the wider society, 
but the boundary wall by which the sect members cut themselves 
off from those institutions. 
But the sect members' style of risk management is a holistic 
one and they do work at it very hard - endlessly patrolling their 
dykes like a lot of little Dutch boys looking for holes to put 
their fingers in - and it is quite likely that they will, quite 
inadvertently, do us all a favor by discovering holes that lie 
beyond the field of vision of the entrepreneur and of the hermit 
and that have been overlooked in the compartmentalised approach 
of the caste member. Provided we do not take what they say at 
its face value, sects can act as very effective (and inexpensive) 
sniffers-out of those real long term external risks that have 
gone undetected in the other social contexts. 
Finally, I must stress that these few examples I have given 
of the different institutional styles of risk management and of 
their effectiveness are highly tentative. They are in no way 
to be seen as hard-and-fast conclusions; they are a skimpy set 
of trial hypotheses which will have to be tested and refined many 
times before they can pass for anything more than hint of what 
it is that this cultural approach may achieve. 
JUSTIFLCATIOIJS PC)? THE FIYPOTHESLS 
These can be of two types: theoretical (in which the 
hypothesis is derived by rigorous: argument from a set of 
explicit initial assumptions) and practical (in which you look 
to see whether you can apply it, and if so, does it work?). 
There is now a considerable body of theoretical and practical 
justification and it may be appropriate here to explain something 
of this in order to provide some indication of the robustness 
of the hypothesis that underlies this whole approach. Much 
depends on the two axes of social context. From the perspective 
of theory, are they (a) independent and (b) sufficient? From 
the perspective application, can they be measured? 
Croups are patterns of relationships that are, as it were, 
independent of the individual who happens to be taken as the 
reference point. If A and B are both members of a group then 
the list of all the people A is related to and the list of all the 
people B is related to will be identical (except that A's list 
will include B and B's list will include A) and the same will 
hold for every member of that group.20 But not all an individual's 
social relationships are necessarily group relationships. Some 
may constitute his network. A network is not independent of the 
individual who is taken as the reference point - it is ego-focused. 
A's network may include B but B's network will not be the same 
as A's. Though there is often some scope for an individual to 
perceive some of his relationships one way rather than the otherf2' 
all socialrelationships resolve into groups or networks. Since, 
of the two axes of social context used in the hypothesis, one 
refers to group involvement and the other to network involvement 
it follows that these axes are (a) sufficient and (b) independent. 
On the practical front, it has now been shown that these two 
dimensions do vary independent1 and that they can both be 
measured using ordinal scales. 2r This was achieved with 
questionnaires and a subsequent pilot project that used informal 
guided interviews has been able to take account of the third 
dimension as well and has successfully separated the strategies 
that individuals in the various social contexts are following.23 
The fact that these dimensions .can in practice only be measured 
on ordinal scales means that, if there are more than five equi- 
librium states, they cannot be handled without more dimensions. 
If thereare only two dimensions to social context (and I would 
argue on theoretical grounds that this is so and on practical 
grounds that two is enough to handle the diversity that confronts 
US) then a fivefold disaggregation represents the limits of 
resolution that is possible with this hypothesis. 
Since two dimensions of social context is all that are possible 
theoretically and all that are needed in practice, the existence 
of this limit need cause no dismay, and I should point out that, 
in handling two dimensions, the theory is handling one more than 
do most of the grand theorists in the social sciences (for example: 
Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity, 
Sir Henry Maine's historical transition from status to contract, 
and Tbnnieslcontrast between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft!. 
Perhaps the most compelling justification for this hypothesis 
is the part theoretical/part practical exercise in which these 
single dimension dichotomies, that have had (and continue to 
have) so powerful an influence on the shaping of social enquiry, 
have been shown to be 'special cases' within this two-dimensional 
scheme. 2 4  
?owever, all this is taking us away from our present concern 
and I have only introduced it to this extent in order to show 
that there is considerable theoretical and practical justifi- 
cation for this cultural approach and for the deep hypothesis 
on which it rests. The model can be operationalised, the 
dimensions are measurable, and the strategies are separable. 
Nor is it one af those hypothesesthat cannot be proved 
wrong. The predictions it makes are precise and detailed and the 
hypothesis will stand or fall depending on whether the five 
strategies separate clearly, on whether these separations 
relate to social context in the manner specified by the hypothesis 
and on whether both strategies and social context in turn 
correlate with the predicted fivefold separation of cosmologies. 
These tests are at the general level and they can be re- 
inforced by a corresponding battery of tests at the specific 
level relating to risk perception and risk evaluation. For 
example, the hypothesis predictsthat experts will only be found in 
three of the five social contextsfand that the way in which they 
are treated will vary systematically between these three contexts. 2 5  
The hypothesis makes similarly precise and testable predictions 
about how the perceptions and evaluations of the long term will 
change as we go from context to context. 
.WHY WE NEED TO LOOK AT THE INDIVIDUAL 
Since it is one of my main contentions that the human 
individual is ill-equipped for coping with risk and that most 
of risk handling is done through social and cultural institutions, 
I will need to explain why it is that I choose not to approach 
these crucial institutions direct but, instead, elect to take this 
indirect approach by way of the individual and his socially- 
induced biases in perception and preferred strategy. First, 
I should stress that I approach the individual as a s o c i a l  b e i n g  
and, in so doing, avoid falling prey to the individualist fallacy. 
The Individualist Fallacy 
The decisionmaker, when he finally arrives at the realisation 
that he is faced, not with a technical problem, but with one that 
has to dowithpeople, tends to reach for his psychologist. He 
is, alas, wrong again. 
The individualist fallacy is a specific version of the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness. 26  In the first instance, this 
fallacy takes the form of assuming that risk is something 
inherent in our external world - that the risks that threaten 
us are determined by the inherent physical properties of the 
universe. It is this assumption that leads the decisionmaker to 
believe that the problem he faces is a technical one 27 and that 
leads him to hire various technical experts who claim to be able 
to solve it. Two difficulties result. First, the technical 
experts can n e v e r  gain access to all the risks that are deter- 
mined by the universe. Second, public policy (unfortunately, 
perhaps) involves the public,and some of its members it turns 
out do not revise their varied perceptions of the risks 'out 
there' to bring them into line with those of the experts. 
Which social choice should the decisionmaker take: the 
Platonic one based on what the real risks are (as far as the 
expert can see, that is) or the Benthamite one based on some 
aggregation of what people believe the risks to be? If he opts 
for the Benthamite alternative then he will need to hire some 
different experts - those who can tell him what people think 
the risks are. But the psychologist still retains as his datum 
the real risks 'out there1. He discovers threshold points for low 
probability/high consequence events, he discovers persistent 
over-estimators and persistent under-estimators, optimists and 
pessimists, ... risk-accepting and risk-averse individuals; all 
plotted in against the same vast expanse of misplaced concrete - 
that totality of risks determined by the universe. 
Far from being dismayed by the unattainability of that 
which the risk assessor and the psychologist have set their 
hearts on, the anthropologist will point out that this un- 
attainable goal is not what risk is about anyway. Of course, 
the universe is not irrelevant, but it is not what determines 
the area of concern that we are referring to when we talk about 
risk. Rather than being something that is inherent in the 
external world, risk and its absence are qualities that are 
c o n f e r r e d  upon it by social processes. These social processes, 
as they blot out some risks that are really there and as they 
set down others that have no counterpart in physical reality, 
create a fluctuating pool of risks somewhere between us and the 
universe. Since any debate about risk must take place within 
a social setting, it will inevitably be a debate about the 
properties of this fluid pool. Anyone who claims that it is 
not - that it is about the concrete expanse that lies somewhere 
beyond this pool - is falsely claiming to be a 'cosmic exileI.28 
This - the cosmic exile's impossible claim - is the fallacy 
of misplaced concreteness. It is the naive assumption of the 
environmental fundamentalist who, when he looks at the world, 
believes that he is seeing it with the naked eye. And it is a 
serious fallacy. It is not some trivial little objection to be 
circumvented by conceding a touch of 'subjectivity' as the 
engineer moves from analysis to evaluation; nor is it something 
that can be put right by the addition of a 'social science 
input' - by bringing in 'the behavioral engineers' to sort out 
the 'people problems'. It is nothing less than a total mis- 
apprehension of what risk is. 
Risk, though it has some roots in nature, is inevitably 
subject to social precesses. Since we (being members of society) 
are at one end of these processes, we can never gain access to 
the raw unprocessee reality. Whether we like it or not, the 
risks to which we have access are p r o c e s s e d  risks. If only we 
concede that this is so, and stop pretending that we can get 
at the risks before they have been processed, then we can begin 
to understand something about them - we can begin to understand 
the processes of which they are the end-products. And the first 
thing that we must understand is that these processes have very 
little to do with the individual as an isolated entity; they 
demand very little of his innate sensory apparatus but a great 
deal of his socially-acquired referential apparatus. They are 
pre-eminently s o c i a l  processes. 
An individual is led to impose cut-off points, not because 
his eyesight is not good enough or his nose not up to the job 
of sniffing beyond a certain range, but because of the social 
and cultural institutions that are stabilized and made credible 
for him by virtue of his social context and its appropriate 
cosmology. As long as those institutions remain credible - as 
long as he is prepared to go along with them - they will do the 
risk management (the imposition of thresholds and the setting 
of their levels) for him automatically. A different individual 
in a different social context is led to impose on his external 
world all kinds of risks that have no physical counterpart (or 
at least none that is detectable), not because he is suffering 
from some serious malfunction of his sensory equipment, but because 
the different social and cultural institutions that he finds 
credible do it for him, automatically. 
Human evolution has transferred risk perception from the 
individual (as a psycho-physiological unit) to the social fabric 
of which he is part (and as an adaptive mechanism it has, up to 
now, proved remarkably successful). In their handling of risk 
humans do not act as individuals but as social beings sensitively 
tuned to social pressures and submissive to mutual coercion. 
The Individual as a Social Being 
The hypothesis in terms of the individual and his social 
context is specifically designed to handle the individual, not 
as an isolated entity, but as a social being. The social units 
that do the risk handling come in a variety of forms - bounded 
groups, hierarchical organisations, competing personal networks... 
atomized communities29 - and they run the entire gamut from vast 
Federal agencies to tiny self-helparrangementsorganised by 
nothing more formal than a shared sense of neighbourliness. The 
two dimensions of social context allow us to go behind these 
contingent differences and to categorise any individual according 
to the way in which he is involved with, or free from, these 
various social units. 
If he belongs to a bounded group that can impose severe 
sanctions on its members then he will score positively on the 
group dimension. If he is at the centre of an extensive personal 
network he will be imposing prescriptions upon those individuals 
who are towards its periphery and so he will score negatively 
on the grid dimension?O If he wishes to purchase some drug that 
has been banned by the Food and Drug Administration his life will 
be limited (ever so slightly) by an impersonally imposed 
prescription . If he is subject to many such prescriptions (if 
he is peripheral to the personal networks of others, for instance) 
he will score positively on the grid dimension. On the other 
hand, if he is central to an extensive network and immune from 
group loyalties and sanctions, he will have the resources, the 
necessary information and the will to just go out and buy the 
forbidden drug on the grey market. 31 In that case he will score 
negatively on both group and grid dimensions. If he is a self- 
employed and largely self-sufficient farmer, whose involvement 
with his similarly situated neighbours,though convivial, is 
essentially voluntary then he will score zero on both dimensions. 32 
In this way, as we plot our individuals onto the social map, 
we build up a scatter diagram that will reveal which sorts of 
social units predominate in that society, and highlight where the 
potentially troublesome polarizations of affiliation to those 
units are located.33 Individuals in one category of social 
context will, as social beings, be sensitively tuned (by their 
cosmology and their strategy) to the social pressures character- 
istic of that context and they will be disposed to submit them- 
selves tothekinds of mutual coercion that are characteristic 
of that context. 
These different kinds of social pressure and different kinds 
of acceptable coercion manifest themselves in social and cultural 
institutions. The Sherpa, by and large, avoids mentioning the 
names of the dead; the lower caste Hindu, by and large, defers 
the high caste Brahmin; the lineage member whose crops have been 
spoiledby flooding goes to his kin on the higher ground and asks 
them to make good his loss and they for their part, mindful that 
in periods of drought positions are likely to be reversed, 
accede to his request. In other words, different kincs of 
institution are appropriate to different social contexts. Social 
context is, as it were, the soil in which institutions grow. 
The institutions (changing the metaphor) are a kind of automatic 
pilot; the individual grants credence to them and, in return, 
the institutions look after the risks for him. From this it 
follows that (a) different kinds of institution will tend to 
flourish in different social context 'soils' - that different 
institutionalised ways of handling risk will evolve in different 
social contexts - and (b) that whether an institution flourishes 
or withers will depend on whether individuals continue to grant 
credibility to it. If an individual's social context, for some 
reason, changes then he will be tempted to over-ride the automatic 
pilot that previously handled his risks for him. He will begin 
to question the legitimacy of the institutions, and risks of 
which previously he was scarcely aware will suddenly, as they 
become his personal concern, loom large and threatening. 
If we looked only at the institutions, and not at the 
individuals who either support or fail to support them, then 
we could say nothing about the appropriateness of institutions 
nor could we begin to understand the dynamic social processes 
that distribute credibility this way rather than that and, in 
so doing, uphold one institution and cause thecollapseof another. 
For instance, perhaps the most alarming of all the problems 
that have emerged from around the nuclear debate has to do with 
the way in which institutions that have long given sterling 
service have become paralysed. Our institutions are designed 
to provide us with decisions (and with good decisions, to boot) 
yet everywhere we see policies stymied and nuclear industries 
declining into bankruptcy, not because our institutions have 
decided that all things considered that is what should be happening, 
but because they simply can no longer come up with any decisions - 
even bad ones! Any approach that concerns itself only with the 
institutions and not with the social dynamics of their support 
will be powerless to explain why hitherto healthy institutions 
have suddenly become paralysed in this distressing way. And, 
i f  it canno t  d i a g n o s e  t h e  d i s e a s e ,  what hope i s  t h e r e t h a t  it 
w i l l  be a b l e  t o  come up w i t h  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  t h a t  w i l l  e f f e c t  a  
r e c o v e r y ?  
NOTES 
1 .  The i n d i v i d u a l ,  it should be s t r e s s e d ,  i s  handled a s  a  
s o c i a l  being n o t  a s  a  unique phycho-physiological  e n t i t y .  
But it i s  n o t  be ing  argued t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  i n d i s t i n g u i s h -  
a b l e  empty v e s s e l s  u n t i l  t hey  a r e  f i l l e d  wi th  t h e  b r e a t h  of 
s o c i a l  l i f e ,  on ly  t h a t  t h e  manner of  t h e i r  involvement i n  
s o c i a l  l i f e  w i l l  superimpose a  d i s t i n c t i v e  b i a s  upon whatever 
was t h e r e  t o  begin wi th .  
Once an i n d i v i d u a l  has  become a  s o c i a l  be ing  it i s  o f t e n  
d i f f i c u l t ,  and sometimes imposs ib le ,  t o  say  where t h i s  l i n e  
between o r i g i n a l  c o n t e n t  ( n a t u r e )  and s o c i a l  ove r l ay  ( n u r t u r e )  
l i e s .  A consequence of t h i s  i s  t h a t ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h i s  
l i n e  is  b l u r r e d ,  t h e  concerns  of t h e  p sycho log i s t  and t h e  
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t  ove r l ap .  Anthropology has  o f t e n  tended t o  
p u l l  back from t h i s  fuzzy r eg ion ;  t h e  p r e s e n t  approach does 
t h e  oppos i t e .  
2 .  Though I have spoken of  it a s  a  c u l t u r a l  approach it i s ,  
proper ly-speaking,  an approach i n  terms of c u l t u r a l  b i a s .  
I am i n t e r e s t e d  i n  p a t t e r n s  of c u l t u r e  r a t h e r  than  i n  
c u l t u r e  i t s e l f  and s o ,  i n  t h i s  s ense ,  t h e  concept of  s o c i a l  
con tex t  i s  f r e e  from c u l t u r a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n .  
3 .  Refer h e r e  t o  DOUGLAS, Mary I n t e r m e d i a t e  Scc<cic;y ( a  
l e c t u r e  o r  paper which h a s , I  t h i n k ,  been p u b l i s h e d ) .  
4 .  S t r i c t l y  speaking,  t h e  maximum number i s  nine  wi th  zero  
p o i n t s  on each dimension and 4 without  them: 
But i s  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t ,  when t h e  t h i r d  dimension i s  i n t r o d u c e d ,  
o n l y  f i v e  o u t  o f  t h e s e  n i n e  have  s t a b i l i z a b l e  e q u i l i b r i a  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  them. Before  w e  can app ly  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  each  o f  t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s  must cor respond  t o  
a  s t a b i l i z a b l e  e q u i l i b r i u m  w e  have t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  a  t h i r d  
dimension so as t o  b e  a b l e  t o  d e p i c t  t h e  s i n g u z a r i t i e s  (peaks ,  
t r o u gh s  and s a d d l e p o i n t s )  t h a t  are t h e  p r e c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  
s t a b i l i z a b l e  e q u i l i b r i a .  
I n  t h e  f o u r  c a t e g o r y  c a s e ,  w e  have t o  have a t  leas t  two 
peaks and t w o  t r o u g h s ;  t h e  peaks be ing  a t  t h e  ends  o f  one  
d i a g o n a l  (which Douglas h a s  c a l l e d  t h e  s t a b l e  d i c g o n a l ) ,  t h e  
t r o u g h s  a t  t h e  ends  of  t h e  o t h e r  d i a g o n a l  ( t h e  u n s t a b l e  
d i a g o n a l ) .  Such a  l andscape  has  t o  c o n t a i n  a n o t h e r  
s i n g u l a r i t y  - a  s ad d l e -po in t  - where t h e s e  d i a g o n a l s  cross 
and t h i s  means t h a t  t h e  minimum number of  s t a b i l i z a b l e  
e q u i l i b r i a  i n  t h e  f o u r  c a t e g o r y  case i s  f i v e  (see diagram 
on page 4 )  b u t  t h a t  t h e  s add l e -po in t ,  though it h a s  t o  b e  
t h e r e ,  c an n o t  b e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  
I n  t h e  n i n e  c a t e g o r y  c a s e ,  t h e  same f i v e  s t a b i l i z a b l e  equ t -  
l i b r i a  have t o  b e  p r e s e n t  b u t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  now 
t h e  s ad d l e - p o i n t  can  be  d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  What i s  more, it i s  
a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  f o u r  more p o i n t s  - t h o s e  mid- 
way a l o n g  t h e  f o u r  s i d e s  of  t h e  matrix - and w e  need t o  a sk  
whether  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e s e  w e  uncover any more s t a b i l i z a b l e  
e q u i l i b r i a .  The f i r s t  p a r t  of  t h e  answer i s  t h a t ,  though 
t h e r e  do n o t  have t o  be  s t a b i l i z a b l e  e q u i l i b r i a  a t  t h e s e  f o u r  
i d e n t i f i a b l e  p o i n t s ,  t h e r e  c an  be.  The second p a r t  o f  t h e  
answer i s  t h a t ,  i f  t h e  l andscape  does  indeed  f l a t t e n  o u t  a t  
t h o s e  f o u r  p o i n t s ,  t h i s  does  n o t  r e s u l t  i n  any i n c r e a s e  i n  
t h e  number o f  s t a b i l i z a b l e  e q u i l i b r i a .  A l l  t h a t  h a s  happened 
i s  t h a t  t h e  s ad d l e - p o i n t  h a s  s p r e a d  o u t  u n t i l  it h a s  reached  
t h e  f o u r  p o i n t  mid-way a long  t h e  f o u r  s i d e s .  So t h i s  n i n e  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p i c t u r e  i s  s imply  a  t r i v i a l  ex t ens ion  o f  t h e  f i v e  
e q u i l i b r i u m  one.  
5.  For some, t h e  word ' m a n ipu l a t e '  may be  va lue - laden .  N o  such 
judgement is  i n t en d ed  h e r e .  The s imp le  f a c t  is t h a t  s o c i a l  
l i f e  o f t e n  i n v o l v e s  m an ipu l a t i on  - a  f a c t  t h a t  some w i l l  deny 
and o t h e r s w i l l  acknowledge. The p r e s e n t  argument i s  t h a t  
t h e s e  d i v e r g e n t  r e sp o nse s  (and  t h e  f u r t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n s  
between t h o s e  who, i n  acknowledging t h i s  f a c t ,  r e g a r d  
manipu la t ion  a s  i n e v i t a b l e ,  r e g r e t t a b l e ,  avo idab l e . . .  d e s i r a b l e )  
a r e  n o t  u n i n f l u en ced  b y - s o c i a l  c o n t e x t .  
6 .  For a  f u l l e r  t r e a t m e n t  and f o r  some i l l u s t r a t i o n  s e e  
THOMPSON, Michael ,  ' A  t h r e e  d imens iona l  model o f  r i s k  
p e r c e p t i o n '  and 'The problem of  t h e  c e n t r e '  i n  DOUGLAS, Nary 
and OSTRANDER, David ( e d s . )  E s s a y s  i n  t h e  S o c i o l o g y  o f  
P e r c e p t i o n .  Ront ledge ,  Kegan P a u l ,  London and B a s i c  Books, 
N e w  York ( t o  be p u b l i s h e d  J a n u a r y  1981) .  T h i s  i s  t h e  s i m p l e s t  
p o s s i b l e  l a n d s c a p e  and d i f f e r s  from t h e  one  used e l s e w h e r e  
( e . g . ,  i n  IIASA Working Paper  The S o c i a l  Landscape o f  P o v e r t y )  
i n  n o t  i n c l u d i n g  any c a t a s t r o p h e s .  These have  been o m i t t e d  
because  t h e y  make no d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  argument.  
7 .  S t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g ,  some c o n j u n c t i o n s  may n o t  b e  un ique .  See 
c u s p  c a t a s t r o p h e s  d e p i c t e d  i n  t h e  f u l l  model - ' A  t h r e e  
d imens iona l  model '  op.  c i t .  
8. ' P e r c e p t i o n '  i s  b e i n g  used h e r e  i n  t h e  l a y  s e n s e  o f  g u t  
c o n v i c t i o n s  a b o u t  how t h i n g s  a r e  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  narrower  
meanings3f  t h e  word a s  it is d e f i n e d  by p s y c h o l o g i s t s  and 
p h y s i o l o g i s t s .  See  OTWAY, Harry  J. 'The p e r c e p t i o n  o f  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r i s k s .  P roceed ings  of  t h e  CEC/CERD Seminar 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r i s k :  i t s  p e r c e p t i o n  and h a n d l i n g  i n  t h e  
European Community,  B e r l i n ,  FRG, 1 - 3 Apr. 1979. 
9 .  These d i f f e r e n t  k i n d s  of  e x p e r t s  and t h e  way i n  which t h e y  
m a n i f e s t  themse lves  i n  t h e  d e b a t e s  o v e r  ene rgy  f u t u r e s  and 
o v e r  t h e  s i z e  o f  o i l  and g a s  reserves w i l l  b e  d e s c r i b e d  i n  a 
l a t e r  Working Paper  - B l i n d  S p o t s  i n  R i s k  P e r c e p t i o n .  
1 0 .  N o t  s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  t h i s  f r i e n d  o f  t h e  e a r t h  o f t e n  j o i n s  w i t h  
o t h e r s  t o  become a  F r i e n d  o f  t h e  E a r t h  and t o g e t h e r  t h e y  draw 
up B l u e p r i n t s  f o r  S u r v i v a l  d e s i g n e d  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  e a r t h  
does  n o t  d i s a p p e a r  b e f o r e  t h e i r  i n h e r i t a n c e  f a l l s  due .  
1 1 .  For  f u r t h e r  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  
s c e n a r i o s ,  i n  t h e  form o f  a  m a t r i x  showing how t h e  o t h e r  
i n c r e d i b l e  s c e n a r i o s  a r e  p e r c e i v e d  from each  c r e d i b l e  
s c e n a r i o ,  see: HARMON, W i l l i s ,  REUYL, J. e t  a l .  S o l a r  
Energy i n  A m e r i c a ' s  F u t u r e  Ch. 5 ,  The b r o a d e r  i s s u e s .  
Working Paper  SRI March 1977. 
1 2 .  For t h e  e l a b o r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  see DOUGLAS, Mary. 1970. P u r i t y  
and Danger Rout ledge  and Kegan P a u l ,  London. For i t s  
r e l e v a n c e  t o  r i s k  and p u b l i c  p o l i c y  s e e :  DOUGLAS, Mary 1972. 
'Environments  a t  r i s k '  i n  BENTHALL, J o n a t h a n  ( e d . ) ,  
E c o l o g y :  The Shaping  E n q u i r y .  Longman, London. 
The r e a s o n  why t h e y  have t o  b e  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  medium o f  
r e a l  p h y s i c a l  r i s k s  i s  t h a t ,  under  t h e  s t r i c t  regime o f  
c o l l e c t i v i s e d  c o n t r o l  t h a t  t e n d s  t o  b e  g e n e r a t e d  by t h i s  
c o n t e x t ,  t h i s  i s  j u s t  a b o u t  t h e  o n l y  p e r m i s s i b l e  medium. 
See:  OWEN, Dennis.  ' S p e c t r a l  Evidence:  Body Metaphor and 
S o c i a l  Exper ience  i n  t h e  Salem W i t c h c r a f t  T r i a l s . '  i n  
DOUGLAS, Mary and OSTRANDER, David ( e d s . )  Essays  i n  t h c  
Soc ioZogy  o f  Peroep t iorz .  (Forthcoming i n  J a n .  1 9 8 1 ) .  B a s i c  
Books N e w  York, and Rout ledge ,  Kegan P a u l ,  London. 
1 4 .  The c l a s s i c  work b e i n g :  EVANS-PRITCHARD, E . E .  W i t c h c r a f t  
O r a c l e s  and : ~ l a g i z  Among t h e  Azande .  
15. An illustration of such a risk currently in this flexible 
state is provided by the debate in Britain about the 
controversial legislation that has made the wearing of 
safety helmets (or should one say crash-hats) compulsory 
for motor cyclists. 
16. For instance, from nuclear weapons into nuclear power. 
There are two kinds of radioactive material in the United 
States - military and civilian. This is not a physical 
distinction - it is an administrative one - and it is a 
distinction which is probably notshared. by anyone wishing 
to steal such material in order to make a.nuclear device 
of his own. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently 
funding a research project (at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 
to systematically consider all the possibilities of such 
diversion but, because its terms of reference do not extend 
to the military material, the crucial calculation of the 
point at which as the security system is improved the 
adversary will decide that it is easier to steal a readymade 
bomb rather than all that civilian material has been 
completely overlooked. 
17. Sherpa villagers in Nepal, for instance, and caretakers of 
small office buildings in Washington D.C. 
18. For an explanation of how social context relates to 
variations in personal resource management and personal 
need manageme,;, see IIASA Working Paper - The S o c i a l  
Landscape o f  P o v e r t y .  
19. It has been suggested (CLARK, William 1980, 'Witches, Floods 
and Wonder Drugs' in SCHWING, R., and ALBERS, W., (eds.) 
S o c i e t a l  R i s k  Assessmen t .  Plenum, New York.) that some 
risks should be taken away from the regulatory agencies 
and given over to individual management because they would 
be handled better that way. The trouble is to know which 
risks should be handed over and to know whether such a 
transfer will benefit all the people or only some of the 
people. The 'economies of scale testt should help to sort 
out the risks by their technologies, while the disaggregation 
based on the five categories should help in telling who will 
be advantaged and who will be disadvantaged. 
20. Strictly speaking, there may well be other individuals on 
A's list and Bts list because of their non-group relation- 
ships. The crucial point is that the group relationships 
will constitute a common core running through the relation- 
ships of all the members of the group. 
21. This is because social relationships have some curious 
properties when it comes to transitivity. In general, 
social relationships are transitive in that, if A is related 
to B and. B is related to C, then A is related to C; but 
at the same time it does not follow thatAis related to, 
say, T or Z. Strictly speaking, if the relationships are 
transitive, A must be related to T and to Z but he simply 
may n o t  b e  a b l e  t o  see t h a t  f a r ;  so it i s  t h e  i d e n t i t y ,  
n o t  t h e  t r a n s i t i v i t y ,  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  c a n  have  
t h i s  c u t - o f f  p o i n t .  Moreover ,  t h e  c u t - o f f  p o i n t  c a n  
i t s e l f  v a r y  w i t h  s o c i a l  c o n t e x t  - f o r  t h e  h e r m i t  it i s  v e r y  
c l o s e ;  t h e  c a s t e  m e m b e r  and  t h e  sect member may b e  a b l e  t o  
see f a r  i n t o  t h e  s o c i a l  d i s t a n c e .  
HAMPTON, James, ' G i v i n g  g r i d / g r o u p  d i m e n s i o n s  a n  o p e r a t i o n a l  
d e f i n i t i o n '  i n  DOUGLAS, Mary and  OSTRANDER, David ( e d s . )  
Essays i n  t h e  SocioZogy o f  P e r c e p t i o n .  Basic Books,  
New York,  and  R o u t l e d g e ,  Kegan P a u l ,  London. (To b e  
p u b l i s h e d  J a n .  1 9 8 1 ) .  
See :  IIASA Working P a p e r  - The S o c i a l  Landscape o f  P o v e r t y .  
OSTRANDER, Dav id ,  ' A c c o u n t i n g  f o r  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
b e l i e f s '  i n  DOUGLAS, Mary and  OSTRANDER, David ( e d s . )  
Essays i n  f ie SocioZogy o f  P e r c e p t i o n .  (Fo r thcoming  J a n .  1981)  
Basic Books,  New York, a n d  R o u t l e d g e ,  . - Kegan P a u l ,  London. 
R e s p e c t e d  i n t h e  caste-ist  c o n t e x t ,  s u s p e c t e d  i n  t h e  sectist  
c o n t e x t ,  a n d  u s e d  i n  t h e  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  c o n t e x t .  
WHITEHEAD, A .N .  1926.  S c i e n c e  and  t h e  Modern World.  
Macmi l lan ,  New York. 
R a t h e r  t h a n  one  t h a t  h a s  some t e c h n i c a l  a s p e c t s .  T h i s  is  
n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t  h a s  no  p a r t  t o  p l a y  
i n  r i s k  management, o n l y  t h a t ,  when h e  i n s i s t s  t h a t  t h e  
problem i t s e l f  i s  t e c h n i c a l ,  h e  i s  p l a y i n g  t h e  wrong p a r t .  
QUINE, W.V.O.  1960. Word and O b j e c t .  MIT Cambridge,  Mass. 
page  275. 
T h i s  i s  t h e  o n e  t h a t  h a s ,  by and  l a r g e ,  been  m i s s e d  by 
social  s c i e n t i s t s .  S e e :  MUNCH, P e t e r  A .  'Anarchy  and  
anomie i n  a n  atomist ic s o c i e t y '  Nan ( n . s . )  1 9 7 4 .  2. 
pp. 243-261. A l s o  THOMPSON, Michae l .  'The problem o f  t h e  
c e n t r e  ' (op .  c i t .  1 
30. T h e r e  are good t h e o r e t i c a l  r e a s o n s  why t h e  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which h e  i s  b o t h  i n c l u d e d  and  e x c l u d e d  by 
g r o u p s  and  i n  which  h e  i s  c e n t r a l  t o  o n e  p o w e r f u l  ne twork  
and  p e r i p h e r a l  t o  o t h e r s  a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  o c c u r .  N o r  d o  
t h e y  seem t o  o c c u r  i n  p r a c t i c e .  See  THOMPSON, M i c h a e l .  
"A t h r e e  d i m e n s i o n a l  model  o f  r i s k  p e r c e p t i o n '  ( o p .  c i t . )  
31.  A s i t u a t i o n  s - y m p a t h e t i c a l l y  d e s c r i b e d  by a n  e c o n o m i s t  who 
h i m s e l f  e x h i b i t s  t h e  b i a s  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h i s  c o n t e x t .  
S e e :  FRIEDMAN, M i l t o n .  'The government  as  nanny '  
- - 
; R Z  "istensr r 1 7 t h  A p r i l  1980.  
3 2 .  I n  t h i s  c c n t e x t  n o t  e v e r y o n e ,  I s h o u l d  have  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  
i s  a  h e r m i t .  I t  i s  n o t  s o c i a l  i n v o l v e m e n t  per s e  t h a t  has  
t o  b e  a v o i d e d  b u t  o n l y  c o e r c i v e  s o c i a l  i n v o l v e m e n t .  S e e  
THOMPSON, M i c h a e l :  'The problem o f  t h e  c e n t r e '  ( o p . c i t 1 .  
33. The question of how different kinds of governmental 
institutions act as as to stabilise or destabilise these 
different patterns is touched upon in the next working 
paper - Beyond S e l f - I n t e r e s t :  An A n a l y s i s  o f  a  R i s k  Debate .  
(Some references are still incomplete) 
